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 Abstract  This essay considers the problem of historicity together with the 
 paradoxes of foundation. The concept of lifeworld has been studied mainly in order 
to clarify two orders of problems, the fi rst concerning the relationship between 
 history and the lifeworld, the second concerning the paradoxes contained in the 
 Krisis regarding the possibility to attain a new foundation of transcendental 
 phenomenology. Both issues must be taken into consideration before we question 
the possibility of a science of the lifeworld. 
1  The Problem of Historicity and the Paradoxes 
of Foundation 
 The concept of lifeworld has been studied mainly in order to clarify two orders of 
problems, the fi rst concerning the relationship between history and the lifeworld, 
the second concerning the paradoxes contained in the  Krisis regarding the possibil-
ity to attain a new foundation of transcendental phenomenology. Both issues must 
be taken into consideration before we question the possibility of a science of the 
lifeworld. 
 On the one hand, starting from Ricoeur’s and Landgrebe’s pioneering essays, 1 
much attention has been paid to the problem of historicity. The aim was not to show 
how Husserl, a philosopher with strong interests in mathematics, succeeded in 
structuring a coherent philosophy of history at the end of his career, after decades 
1
  Ricoeur ( 1949 ), Landgrebe ( 1963 ,  1968 ,  1982 ). 
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spent in a deep and, to a certain extent, ambiguous dialog with Dilthey’s  historicism. 2 
Much more interesting was the explanation of the strategies adopted by Husserl in 
developing a transcendental historicity, which can be seen as a consequence—and a 
deepening—of some aspects of Husserl’s philosophy developed during the Twenties, 
that is, time consciousness, passive synthesis and intersubjectivity. It could be dis-
appointing not to fi nd in the late Husserl’s philosophy a fulfi lled project culminating 
in a philosophy of history, the scope of which should be the unfolding of all the 
intentional ties binding together human knowledge of the world and human 
self-positioning in the world itself. Nevertheless, we must be content with the result 
accomplished by Husserl—and with the well grounded supposition that this result 
was precisely what Husserl himself aimed at: the theory of the lifeworld has not 
been conceived to found a new concept of historicity, it is rather the tool needed 
by phenomenology in order to achieve a solid point of departure that makes a 
pheno menologically oriented refl ection on both the natural and the scientifi c 
attitude possible. 3 (I will return to this point later). 
 On the other hand, it is the paradoxical structure that characterizes Husserl’s path 
towards transcendental phenomenology that has drawn much attention. This para-
doxical structure seems to be no obstacle, but rather a rhetoric necessity within the 
argument set out in the  Krisis ; more precisely, it seems to be intrinsically related to 
the impossibility of maintaining a distinction between the transcendental and the 
empirical subject (Hua VI  1954 , 182–185). 4 What we discover after having accom-
plished the reduction, is nothing but the interweaving of ourselves and the general 
structure of the world, the latter considered as the sedimentation [ Sedimentierung ] 
of the never-ending human activity of sensemaking. Surely, according to what 
constitutes the main achievement of Husserl’s philosophy since the  Prolegomena , 
all sensemaking relies on logical structures, the validity of which does not depend 
on their being accomplished within a singular act of judgement. However, the kind 
of intentional analysis developed by phenomenology makes it necessary to make 
evident not only how their instantiation—for example within a singular act of 
judgement—constitutes the condition of possibility for the world to be known by 
any subject whatsoever, but also how the subject itself plays a role in constituting 
the way in which pieces of the world appear in time. The analysis of constitution 
shows that it is not possible to consider the constituting subject as if it were an 
external moment of the process of constitution itself. The phenomenological domain 
described by the term subjectivity is the result of a peculiar way of looking at the 
process of constitution, thanks to which we can point out the role played by the 
subject; but, as a result of the phenomenological analysis, what reveals itself to 
be peculiar to the domain described this way is the fact that the subject which 
constitutes the objects that appear in the fl ow of consciousness and confers them 
with identity and stability, at the same time constitutes itself and its own persistence 
as an identical pole of the subjective processes. 
2
  Ströker ( 1987 ), 160–186. 
3
  Carr ( 1974 ), Ströker ( 1987 ), 139–159. 
4
  Ströker ( 1987 ), 115–138. 
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 From this interconnection of constituting and being constituted stems the fact that 
it becomes more and more diffi cult to maintain the purity that should characterize 
the transcendental sphere of the ego—which is another way to articulate the afore-
mentioned diffi culty of maintaining the distinction between the transcendental 
and the empirical. This state of affairs becomes more evident as soon as we consider 
that the ego envisaged by phenomenological analysis is not simply the individual 
self, but rather a pole belonging to a more extended intentional process. This exten-
sion encompasses not only the intentional life of an individual consciousness, but 
also everything that links this individual consciousness to previous acts of constitution, 
accomplished by other subjects. Every present intentional act of mine is surrounded 
by a living horizon within which a complex set of relationships is still operating, 
and precisely these relationships form the context outside which no individual belief 
could be meaningful: every singular belief is thus interwoven not only with my past 
experience, but also with a wider texture of beliefs constituting the shared meaning 
of the world (Hua VI  1954 , 152, 169). Therefore, the whole generative intersubjec-
tivity, meant as the alternation of human generations within the course of history, 
cannot be detached from the idiosyncratic styles of perceiving and conceiving the 
world that are peculiar to each subject (Hua XI  1966 , 218f). 
 In stressing the importance of the intersubjective structure of the lifeworld, 
Husserl underlines the fact that there is no access to any shared and common 
 experience without our being affected bodily by other subjects: the mere presence 
of others, their actual being here, within my own  Umwelt , or their having been pre-
sent as a member of a historical community I still belong to, constitute the founding 
moment of any actual experience. In this way, phenomenology extends the reach of 
its own analysis to fi elds where the boundary of the egological sphere reveals not the 
mark of a closure, but rather what allows exteriority to affect the inner structure of 
the subject. Intersubjectivity, otherness, corporeality build up together a unit of 
themes the articulation of which shows how much dimension we could qualify as 
anthropological matters for the self-fashioning of the transcendental sphere . 5 
 Thus, both Husserl and his interpreters have to cope with the uncomfortable 
paradox contained in the fact that the subject, called—or, better, summoned—to 
guarantee for the validity of every act of constitution, depends for its own constitu-
tion on what belongs to a sphere of exteriority affected by a relentless contingency. 
The efforts made by Husserl to sidestep this diffi culty could be interpreted as the 
expression of the desire to save both the transcendental role played by the subject 
and the awareness that it is impossible to bestow on the transcendental ego the 
 properties required by the agent supposed to guarantee for what classical philoso-
phy called  Letztbegründung . Regardless of Husserl’s own intentions, one could say 
that phenomenology has simply substituted any form of  Letztbegründung with the 
infi nite operativity ( Fungierung ) of intersubjective life, or, which amounts to the 
same, with the uninterrupted work of constitution carried out by the human 
community. If one wants, on the contrary, to take into account the intentions that 
5
  Zahavi ( 2003 ), 79–140, stresses the importance of the connection between time, corporeality, and 
intersubjectivity in order to understand the meaning of the life-world. 
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animated the Husserlian project, the main effort should consist in clarifying the 
reason why a philosophical account of reality should have its point of departure in the 
subject, as it is the case within the phenomenological version of the transcendental 
argument, and why precisely the argumentative structure of such an account marks 
the difference between phenomenology and other forms of discourse claiming for 
their part to shape through linguistic categories a persuasive description of human 
being in the world. 
 However, what is at stake here is not a defence of Husserl’s attempts to maintain 
the ‘purity’ of the transcendental sphere. Much more important is the question 
concerning the benefi t we can obtain in accepting the transformation that the 
transcendental stance undergoes within the  Krisis . And, again, the way we deal with 
this transformation is important not to measure our fi delity to the Husserlian project 
of a transcendental phenomenology, but to give us the possibility of saving the 
epistemic goal pursued by phenomenology  even in absence of a transcendental 
foundation . 
 This sounds like a strong claim and therefore requires a more extensive explana-
tion. As we have seen, no matter whether we take into consideration the problem of 
history, or the question of what is needed to accomplish a transcendental founda-
tion, we encounter the following questions: is it still possible to speak of a foundation 
if the transcendental subjectivity that should sustain the burden of it coincides with 
the process of constitution itself? Are we forced to see in the Husserlian solution 
nothing but a doomed attempt to elude the  fact that the transcendental domain 
coincides with the domain of history—a domain affected by an irreducible fi niteness? 
An answer should not be attempted too hastily. There are good reasons, in fact, for 
questioning any attempt to let phenomenology fl ow into hermeneutics too quickly, 
which would be precisely the result of an assumption that transcendentality and 
historicity coincide. Even if we feel uncomfortable with the term ‘transcendental,’ 
we must recognize that the rhetorical function it exerts cannot be renounced too 
easily: the transcendental stance is plainly the philosophical stance meant as the 
possibility of a critical attitude towards reality, as the uninterrupted work of ques-
tioning every realm of the world with no reference to an agency supposed to 
transcend the world itself. In Husserlian terms, it is the attitude we attain whenever 
we keep the world at a distance in order to refl ect on our being engaged in the world, 
or, better, on our being engaged in that given network of relationships that make 
possible the validity of the common knowledge of the world (Hua VI  1954 , 153). 
 Furthermore, forcing Husserl’s late philosophy into any form of historicism 
yields little benefi t in philosophical terms. The battle fought by Husserl against any 
form of psychologism—with historicism as one of its forms—belongs to the peren-
nial effort made by philosophy to state that concepts like ‘truth,’ not to mention the 
concept of ‘concept,’ are  not parts of a whole called ‘nature,’ or the ‘empirical 
world’ if you prefer. It could be more appropriate, then, to fi nd the solution for the 
questions posed above precisely in turning the paradox into an epistemic resource. 6 
As we shall see, what is aimed at in this way is not the validation of Husserl’s efforts 
6
  Even if with different aims, a similar solution has been suggested in Dodd ( 2004 ). 
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to safeguard the transcendental character of phenomenology at any rate. Much more 
important is the yield obtained by investing in a philosophical project the gen-
erative element of which allows for the renouncing of any foundational stance. 7 
Postfoundationalism means here not only to assume that phenomenology achieves 
its signifi cance as a philosophical project only through its capability of establishing 
 only the conditions of possibility of validity, and by far  not the conditions of possi-
bility of experience; it also means that the possibility of a transcendental questioning 
depends on historical factors, an exhaustive analysis of which is, in principle, 
impossible. The coincidence between empirical and transcendental ego seen by 
Husserl as the paradox of transcendental phenomenology could be thus interpreted 
as the clue of the fact that a transcendental questioning remains a  possibility , which 
each subject can always put into operation, yet without being able to justify the 
 necessity of accomplishing it. 
 Truly, there is no phenomenological self-positioning in the world if the subject 
avoids carrying out the  epoché , as it can be stated, for example, by looking at the 
sense of the controversy between Husserl and Heidegger during the late Twenties. 
In other words, a theoretical necessity, deeply rooted in the phenomenological mode 
of thought, brings Husserl to establish the  epoché as the doorway to phenomenol-
ogy. But this necessity, I argue, is largely rhetorical in nature and related to the 
diffi culties phenomenology meets when it has to articulate, at the argumentative 
level, its own paradoxical position. As Husserl himself states, carrying out the 
 epoché is an exercise (Hua VI  1954 , 140; Hua VII  1959a , 279f; Hua VIII  1959b , 
11f), a  praxis which can not be justifi ed only in theoretical terms; or, better, it is a 
performance carried out by a subject that was not otherwise able to manage its own 
position as a transcendental agent in the awareness that this position does not mean 
exteriority with respect to experience. Considered this way, the  epoché loses its 
foundational character, but it maintains its role within a transcendental argument, 
the core of which is to be displaced differently from the traditional way of under-
standing it, that is, it is to be repeated and re-shaped as a fi gure of speech which 
performs the accomplishment of that stance which we can at best defi ne through 
the adjective ‘critical.’ 
 The core of the argument I am putting forth here consists of the aforementioned 
fact that the position of the subject exercising the critique cannot be considered as 
the point of departure that allows access to an absolute exteriority. On the one hand, 
Husserl’s phenomenology pursued as its deepest aim the destruction of any form of 
ingenuous realism, that is, of the idea that reality can be approached with immedi-
acy—or, if we prefer to say the same in more poetic terms, phenomenology could 
be seen as the rebellion against the tyranny of the sense data. According to Husserl, 
this tyranny must be fought principally in the name of a methodological clarifi cation 
of what informs the scientifi c construction of reality. On the other hand, the decision 
to bring scientifi c constructs back to the lifeworld in order to show that they depend 
7
  Even if oriented towards issues that differ from the one discussed here, the question of a postfoun-
dational attitude within the phenomenological project is also raised and discussed in Mensch 
( 2001 ) and Drummond ( 1990 ). 
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on intersubjectivity is not motivated by the goal to substitute scientifi c realism with 
that form of realism which accompanies our ordinary experience of the world. 
The latter, in fact, knows its own way to conceal the role played by intersubjectivity 
as a presupposition for any human sensemaking, and therefore is not structurally 
 different from the scientifi c attitude, if we look at both from the perspective of 
phenomenology. The problem is that the phenomenologist fi nds herself in a position 
that is rooted in the fi eld of intesubjectivity as well: a position that allows looking at 
the processes of constitution from outside this fi eld simply does not exist. This is the 
reason why critique pursued by phenomenology fi nds its ultimate motivation in 
an ‘existential’ choice, of which it is not possible to give an account thoroughly 
articulated in purely conceptual terms (Hua VI  1954 , 60). 
 Along with the path just traced, where we suggested that the relationship between 
transcendentality and historicity should be interpreted as the starting point for the 
articulation of a postfoundational position, it becomes possible to put the question 
concerning the science of the lifeworld on a basis that should reach beyond the 
impasses met by Husserl. If we are not afraid of considering the coincidence 
between transcendental and empirical as the normal status of the phenomenological 
investigation whenever the question of foundation is at stake, and, furthermore, if 
we are ready to accept that anthropology is the fi nal destiny of phenomenology, then 
to put in practice a science of the lifeworld should not mean to describe the  structures 
of a realm the existence of which is needed to establish the system of all that exists; 
it could rather mean to describe the possibility of invariants within given forms of 
experiencing the world. In this sense, I will argue—and this constitutes the main 
goal of the present essay—that the place the humanities occupy within the encyclo-
paedia is the only possible site where we can fi nd the accomplishment of a science 
of the lifeworld. 
2  Positing the Lifeworld, or How to Supplement 
the Transcendental Position 
 In order to pursue this aim, it should be shown what characteristics could be 
 attributed to the lifeworld. The fi rst thing to be kept in mind is that the lifeworld is 
not a place you can go through, you can inhabit, or where you can smell aromas or 
touch objects. It is not the world of everyday life. 8 Of the latter it is possible to have 
a descriptive science, able to provide us with the main tools needed to build up a 
theory of social action. A theory of social action, to put it briefl y, has to explain 
why human groups, or communities, act in a particular way under circumstances 
that are given each time. Of course, a social theory which does not confi ne itself to 
a simple collection of case studies can provide good—or bad—explanations for the 
reason why a motivation is not precisely a form of causation, that is, it can frame 
8
  Grathoff ( 1989 ), 91–121. 
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its own conceptuality in such a way that it is possible to distinguish the realm of 
human actions from the realm of natural events. Nevertheless, a social theory is not 
forced to give any account of the constitutive operations that led to its own estab-
lishment. In other words, there is no need for it to practice a second order refl ection 
on its own tools and operations. If this is the case, we are looking at a social theory 
that reveals an infl uence either by Husserlian phenomenology, 9 or by another phil-
osophical stream. 10 Precisely the absence of such a second order refl ection makes 
a given social theory not very different from a natural science, which is character-
ized, according to Husserl, by the claim of being able to account for the deep 
structure of reality without exposing the subjective operations that brought about 
the shaping of its own theoretical edifi ce. What the phenomenologist wants to 
provide, instead, is a theory of intersubjectivity, the function of which is to explain 
how the social construction of reality works—including that peculiar form of social 
construction we usually call ‘scientifi c knowledge.’ The point here is that Husserl 
needs to create a ‘place’ (a ‘stage,’ I would even say) where the intersubjective 
construction of reality is made evident—is made visible in absolute purity. Without 
stressing this ‘purity,’ Husserl would hardly be able to attribute a transcendental 
character to intersubjectivity itself. This is also the reason why Husserl emphasizes 
so much the evident character of the objects met in the lifeworld—an emphasis 
which renders the lifeworld a ‘place’ where ordinary events use to happen almost 
regularly, where we expect to meet a given set of objects and not others. In other 
words, in the lifeworld we are expected to encounter all the possible objects, 
whereas it is the inner legality governing this totality that determines the way we 
encounter them (Hua VI  1954 , 142f). 
 No need to say that the lifeworld is a ‘world’ where even the philosopher would 
be out of place. 11 Philosophy is a very peculiar form of sensemaking, universal in its 
forms of expression. “Wonder” [ thaumazein ] was the name given by Greek 
 philosophers to the attitude enabling us to question the mere ‘givenness’ of things, 
in order to grasp what makes the world to be what it is. A similar will to look at the 
things we fi nd in the world without trusting the immediacy that characterizes tour 
experience and knowledge of them is surely to be found among all human cultural 
traditions. This ubiquity of the philosophical gaze at the world must be stressed in 
order to correct the conviction, expressed by Husserl, according to which philoso-
phy is strictly tied with the cultural development of the Western cultural tradition. 
But, apart from any concern for the relationship between philosophy and the 
 cultural context in which it arises, what must be put in evidence now is the fact that 
philosophy gives expression to the desire both to investigate the intimate nature 
of things, and to explore the possibility that things could be different from what 
they are. Strictly related to that desire is the awareness, which increases through 
methodical observation, that we cannot exclude the possibility that, sometimes, 
9
  Luhmann as well as Bourdieu are the authors that could be mentioned in the present context 
(see in particular Bourdieu  1977 and Luhmann  1995 ). 
10
  For example: Winch ( 1958 ) and Bloor ( 1976 ). 
11
  Blumenberg ( 2010 ). 
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there could be a discrepancy between perception and belief, or between how we 
represent the world and how the world effectively is. In other words, it is peculiar 
to what we call philosophy to pose the question of truth. Further refi ned, this 
question gives rise to complex forms of knowledge, thanks to which, if properly 
institutionalized, it becomes possible not only to establish some statements supposed 
to be true about reality, but also to justify why they should be held for true. Yet if the 
lifeworld is the place where evidence characterizes the encounter with every object 
that can be found in it, then the philosophical questioning about the condition of 
possibility of truth remains pointless. 
 In the lifeworld the philosopher would know exactly what grounds those 
 harmonious experiences that she, like any other human being, must presuppose in 
order to cope with any possible alteration of validity. Within our usual intercourse 
with objects it can occur—and in fact occurs—that harmony disappears and our 
experience ceases to be harmonious; both thanks to the corrections I can make, 
and thanks to communalization of what is perceivable, that is, thanks to the fact that 
the world I perceive is the same world that is perceived by others, whose communi-
cation of what they perceive completes what I perceive, it is always possible to 
re-establish a harmonious experience. But such a common understanding of the 
world, such a communalization reached through the uninterrupted re-agreement 
between what I perceive and what is, or has been perceived by others, is possible 
only because I ‘know’ that other human beings are related to same world: both the 
individual subject and others have a common horizon which encompasses the totality 
of all possible things to be met in the course of experience (Hua VI  1954 , 167). 
What Husserl points at by describing the transcendental character of this horizon, is 
the fact that it operates as a presupposition within each form of human intercourse. 
Without having signed any contract, an agreement is always possible as regards the 
concordance of what is perceived within the world. This concordance (or ‘harmony,’ 
the English translation for  Einstimmigkeit ) is precisely the result of the awareness 
that the horizon is always operating as a presupposition held to be present both by 
myself and by others. But it would be misleading to think that this concordance, 
once achieved, coincides with the lifeworld; the lifeworld itself is to be found rather 
on the side of the horizon. In this sense, the lifeworld names the total system of 
multiplicities that makes possible the unity of human experience of the same world. 
This unity can even be missed on occasion, but what counts is the possibility of 
it—a possibility that, according to Husserl, accompanies every single act of 
perception. In itself, however, the horizon cannot become an object we can grasp or 
perceive (Hua VI  1954 , 145f). 12 What can be perceived intuitively is, rather, the 
legal character of it, that is, the fact that the structure of the lifeworld is subject to 
the same inner logic found in every system of multiplicity. 
 However, if we state that the lifeworld is no place for philosophers, because 
within its realm there is no need for any philosophical investigation about the 
reason why the harmony of our experience can sometimes fail, what brought 
Husserl to establish the necessity of the life-world? Why did he choose to introduce 
12
  Held ( 1991 ). 
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this concept? The answer is well known and sounds quite naive: because he needed 
a new point of departure for phenomenology. According to Husserl, this point of 
departure must maintain the purity that is proper to any realm supposed to play a 
transcendental role. Nevertheless, there is something that induces us to think that 
the lifeworld is more or less a phenomenologist’s invention: both the average man 
and the scientist keep on living in the world and experiencing the world without any 
knowledge of the fact that their living in the world or experiencing it presupposes 
the lifeworld. Put like this, it does not sound as serious as it should. Yet, the  invention 
I am talking about must meet the requirements that characterize the conceptual 
objects philosophers are used to dealing with. In fact, without the positioning (in the 
strong sense of  Setzung ) of the lifeworld, there would be nothing to justify the peculiar 
self-positioning of the philosopher in front of both the natural and the scientifi c 
attitude. 13 In this sense, I argue, the lifeworld is supposed to be the proxy of that 
transcendental position that should exist if the philosopher could hold it. We can at 
best explain this argument by turning it into the question about the origin of the 
lifeworld. At a fi rst glance, the lifeworld, being the horizon of our experience, has 
no origin for its own. Not very differently from what happens with the law of logic 
investigated fi rst in the  Prolegomena , and then in  Formale und transzendentale 
Logik , what we envisage when we meet the lifeworld is an object the property of 
which is to exist without any reference to space-time: omnitemporality 
[ Allzeitlichkeit ] is the expression used by Husserl to describe the way of existence 
peculiar to such logical entities. Nevertheless, Husserl did not withdraw from the 
task of phenomenologically investigating the fact that even logical forms and laws 
can be analysed in relation to their being intentioned by a subject. Precisely this 
investigation marked the gap between his position and Frege’s from the beginning 
of their philosophical contention. 14 Furthermore, it is a radicalisation of Husserl’s 
displacement of what defi nes the logical form within a theory of intentional 
 consciousness that led him to add the genetic method to the previous static one. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the thematisation of the lifeworld, which made its appear-
ance in correlation with the establishment of the genetic method, has been carried 
out by Husserl in such a way that the question about the origin of the  lifeworld is far 
from being irrelevant. 
 But how can the lifeworld be originated on its part if its function is precisely to 
make every form of origination possible? It is important not to forget that the 
 lifeworld is the result of a two-fold reduction accomplished in relation both to the 
natural attitude and to the scientifi c attitude. 15 Within the social exchange that char-
acterizes our every day life, we meet other people and objects, or we deal with 
institutions; in none of these circumstances are we aware of the fact that every form 
13
  Ströker ( 1987 , p. 87f). 
14
  Mohanty ( 1982 ), Willard ( 1984 ). 
15
  What follows is an oversimplifi cation, in the sense that I won’t account for the steps necessary to 
pass from the  epoché of the natural attitude to the reduction of the scientifi c one to the evidences 
we can seize in the life-world. For a more detailed account, see Dodd ( 2004 ), 175–206. As far as 
the peculiarity of the reduction of the scientifi c attitude is concerned, see also Kisiel ( 1970 ). 
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of human relationship, every meaningful experience of the external world, as well 
as every commitment we met to the various forms of sociability, formally or 
 informally institutionalised, stems from our being involved in a broader web of 
intersubjective relationships (Hua VI  1954 , 149). Precisely these relationships make 
it possible for our multifaceted exchange with the world to maintain a  constant 
meaning. But they remain constantly concealed: we keep on acting individually as 
if we were detached from the broader context made up by intersubjectivity, a con-
text that frames all our individual action. As far as the concealment of this universal 
frame is concerned, not far more different is the situation that characterizes the 
scientifi c attitude. 16 In the case we decide to investigate the world from a scientifi c 
perspective, we can then attain a comprehensive knowledge of the world from 
which we would be precluded if we were still involved in the natural attitude. 17 But 
each member of the scientifi c community works on her own research program, 
closely with other colleagues, without questioning the operations needed to attain 
scientifi c knowledge itself. In Husserl’s terms, the scientifi c interest that motivates 
each member of the scientifi c community is such as to induce a forgiveness of the 
intersubjective operations that brought both to the establishment of science, meant 
as a peculiar way of approaching reality, and to the construction of singular scien-
tifi c theories or doctrines, meant as given instantiation of what science is (Hua VI 
 1954 , 134). 18 In order to establish the visibility of those intentional ties that connect 
both our every day experience of the world and the systematic knowledge of the 
world furnished by science to the web of intersubjective relations, it is thus neces-
sary, according to Husserl, to perform the phenomenological reduction—or, better, 
a twofold one: the fi rst in order to bracket the natural attitude, the second in order to 
disconnect the scientifi c one. As a consequence, the lifeworld is what remains, is 
what we can see operating as system of intersubjective relations presupposed both 
by the natural and by the scientifi c attitude. What must be stressed in the present 
context is the fact that the subject performing the reduction can only be the phenom-
enologically oriented philosopher, with ‘philosopher’ not referring to a particularly 
gifted person: the philosopher in question is simply someone who shares the same 
word in its facticity with others, and can, on occasion, decide to investigate the 
world scientifi cally, but presently makes up her mind to perform the reduction in 
order to disclose the operativity [ Fungierung ] of intersubjectivity. Truly, we have to 
do here with an individual position, which, in principle, everybody can partake in—
16
  Held ( 1991 ) has made the point very clear by defi ning the scientifi c attitude as a second-level 
natural attitude. 
17
  As stated by several passages from his work, Husserl nor put in doubt the achievements of 
scientifi c knowledge, neither was willing to disrupt the idea that scientifi c knowledge is the only 
one giving us the possibility to access the ‘true’ world. Whether the Husserlian conception of the 
relationship between scientifi c knowledge and truth can still be maintained, is an issue we cannot 
address here. On the subject, see Hacking ( 1992 ). 
18
  Fleck ( 1979 ) and Bourdieu ( 2001 ) not only move in the same direction as Husserl, but also show 
how productive a phenomenologically oriented sociology of knowledge could be; nevertheless, 
these contributions still fi nd scarce recognition within Anglo-Saxon sociology of knowledge (even 
if Fleck’s work was issued in 1935). 
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and such a possibility guarantees for the fact that this position maintains  affi nity 
with the universality supposed to characterize the transcendental subjectivity. But 
this affi nity cannot efface the irreducible contingency affecting the position of the 
subject that wants to perform the reduction. 
 Thus, it seems to be justifi ed to claim that the lifeworld is a sort of ‘invention’ by 
phenomenologists in order to make the phenomenological stance possible. The 
 latter reveals to be one possibility, one among others, of looking at the world; other 
attitudes, which are motivated by other interests, can underlie different ways of 
looking at the world, which, of course, still remains the same world we all have in 
common as human beings. As a consequence, the contingent character of the 
motivation that underlies the phenomenological attitude thoroughly affects the 
structure of the lifeworld as well: if taken as the result of a peculiar way of looking at 
the role played by intersubjectivity in order to better understand how the uninterrupted 
work of sensemaking come to existence, the lifeworld seems to be nothing but the 
result of the individually chosen positional act that produces its visibility. What stems 
from this contingency is that the lifeworld is to be understood more as an archive of 
some invariant patterns than as the totality encompassing all what exists within 
human experience. If the lifeworld is the place where these invariants are to be found, 
and if phenomenology is to be the science of the lifeworld, we must now identify the 
peculiarities of the phenomenological inquiry with respect to other disciplines that 
claim, on their part, to be better appointed to carry out the same inquiry. 
3  The Encyclopaedia of the Humanities as Infi nite 
Description of the Lifeworld 
 As a result of the previous analysis, what we want to achieve now is the possibility 
of a science of the lifeworld that coincides with the defi nition of the anthropologi-
cal bases needed to understand the most general pattern of human behaviour. This 
science could claim to be still understood as ‘philosophy’ because of the fact that 
it coincides neither with the natural nor with the scientifi c attitude. What it loses, 
nevertheless, is the adjective ‘transcendental,’ of which Husserl is so fond. Hans 
Blumenberg has spent a lot of philosophical energy showing that the obsession 
with the purity that should characterise the phenomenological discourse prevented 
Husserl from allowing phenomenology to turn itself into a philosophical anthro-
pology. 19 If phenomenology remains a transcendental discourse, than purity is 
 safeguarded. However, this does not offer a great advantage: a ‘pure’ science of the 
lifeworld seems to have a limited descriptive power; as Husserl knew, in fact, 
 psychology (as well as history) can offer better accounts of how human beings act 
in the world. Furthermore, a ‘pure’ science of the lifeworld seems to have a limited 
prescriptive power as well: as we have already pointed out above, both the scientist 
19
  Blumenberg ( 2006 ). 
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and the human beings who fi nd their way about in the world by taking advantage 
from that shared knowledge we call ‘common sense’ are not aware of the evidence 
that informs the lifeworld, and nevertheless they keep on doing what they do 
 seemingly very well (whereas ‘very well’ means ‘in an adaptive manner,’ or ‘in a 
satisfying manner from an adaptive point of view’). The result of Blumenberg’s 
analysis is that renouncing a transcendental stance is a benefi t, and not a loss—a 
benefi t I would describe as an injection of anthropological fl esh into the skeleton 
of the lifeworld. 
 We cannot follow the whole argument made by Blumenberg in order to 
 demonstrate both why Husserl was not able to accept an anthropological stance, 
and why an anthropological turn within phenomenology could be seen as an 
improvement; nevertheless, one point should not be overlooked, and this point can 
be seen as a development of Blumenberg’s whole argument. The reason why 
 phenomenology needs to be turned into anthropology, which obviously has as a 
result the loss of transcendentality, is tightly related with the transcendental stance 
itself. If the transcendental subject refl ects upon its own self-positioning, and takes 
into account the fi niteness that marks its position, the consequence that must be 
drawn is that the subject, precisely for transcendental reasons, is subdued to this 
fi niteness, or, to put it differently, that the subject must ascribe to its own fi niteness 
a transcendental character. The fi niteness we are dealing with here is not a meta-
phorical designation for our being mortal, it is rather the main property of our 
being related to the network of the intentionally structured sensemaking processes 
that constitute the common world and are all together called ‘intersubjectivity’ by 
the phenomenologist: the subject can access this network only through a given 
number of entrances, each of which, in part, is shaped in conformity with the social 
and communicative competences achieved by the subject itself. Thus, this  fi niteness 
is the condition of possibility of our being in the world. Questioning the function-
ing of the relationship between the aforementioned entrances and competences can 
precisely constitute the task of a philosophical investigation of intersubjectivity. 
This investigation will maintain an affi nity with the transcendental analysis of 
the lifeworld in order to defi ne itself as philosophical, but it will at the same time 
spread through the whole complex of disciplines gathered together under the 
title of Humanities, and will therefore coincide, at least in part, with an analysis 
 thoroughly anthropological in character. 
 The question is whether such an anthropologically oriented philosophy still 
maintains a relationship with the phenomenological project. By thematizing the 
lifeworld as an object we can describe and analyse, that is, as an object we can expe-
rience, the phenomenologist is not claiming to be able to put herself in a position 
that is external with respect to the lifeworld itself, as the latter is a totality that 
encompasses both the evidences presupposed by the subjects who act within the 
natural or the scientifi c attitude, and the phenomenologist’s self-positioning that 
makes the coming-to-light of the lifeworld possible. A phenomenological analysis 
of the lifeworld is simply the result of a different way of looking at the lifeworld, a 
way that posits it as the ground [ Boden ] for all what is presupposed by any subject 
that looks at the world from a point of view different from the phenomenological 
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one. We can adopt this solution because we have already stated that the lifeworld 
can emerge and become visible only if the phenomenologist’s glance performs its 
emergence and its visibility. Should Husserl have formulated two different con-
cepts, one for the lifeworld meant as the totality that encompasses both the subjects 
who experience the world and their refl ection upon the world, and another one for 
the lifeworld meant as the ground of all validity? 20 If we answer in the affi rmative, 
we run the risk of missing the productive character of the paradox enunciated by 
Husserl, namely the paradox of a twofold lifeworld, which splits up in order to make 
possible for the subject to refl ect upon that totality in which it still remains included. 
And the productivity of this paradox can be shown precisely in the moment in which 
we deal with the necessity to submit the lifeworld to analysis. 
 Husserl himself can fi gure out the analysis we are talking about only in the form 
of an anthropological analysis. As is to be expected, he makes enormous efforts to 
avoid drawing all the consequences implied by such an analysis. However, it is not 
without signifi cance that he speaks of invariants in order to defi ne the object of this 
analysis. These invariants should constitute the object of investigation of an a priori 
anthropology, which is to be understood as an ontology of the world as well 
(Hua XXXIX  2008 , 57). Without this a priori anthropology the various ways of 
sensemaking, differing from each other both historically and geographically could 
not be perceived as variations of the same world. The world that is supposed to 
remain the same is the world we are familiar with, it is the world that, thanks to its 
own presence and consistence shapes our habits, or, better, makes the emergence of 
habits possible. Now, the fact that the never changing structure of the world is 
strictly interwoven with the possibility for human habits to change both from time 
to time, and from region to region seems to be the presupposition Husserl needs to 
state the identity of an ontology of the world with an a priori anthropology. When 
he asks which is the main characteristic of mankind, that is, which is the peculiarity 
all human beings must share in order to understand themselves as human beings, the 
answer is: their historicity (Hua XXXIX  2008 , 344). No reader of the  Krisis will be 
surprised by this answer. What could be—if not surprising, perhaps a little disturb-
ing—is the way Husserl depicts this historicity. What Husserl points at, in fact, is 
the rootedness of each individual in its community, where it was born, has acquired 
acquaintance with the world, and has gained the opportunity to turn the world itself 
into the mute horizon both of human experience in general, and of its own experi-
ence in particular. The same holds for human groups, no matter whether their 
dimension is small or big as in the case of a nation. Historicity, in this case, means 
to be rooted in a country that allows a strong form of identifi cation—a country, 
therefore, which can be understood in terms of homeland. It is in our homeland that 
the world becomes familiar to us. In fact, there would be no familiarity with the 
world without that form of acquaintance with shared values and shared forms of life 
we can gain only when we participate in the common work that is necessary to 
guarantee the prosecution of the tradition we belong to. Thus, historicity coincides 
20
  The problems concerning the plurivocity of Husserl’s notion of life-world are discussed in 
Claesges ( 1972 ). 
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with the persistence of a generative tradition, with the power possessed by a  tradition 
to live on, to reproduce itself and overwhelm the opposite power of time to destroy 
the traces human beings have left on the earth. Following this train of thought, we 
can fi nd in the third appendix of the  Krisis , namely in the text Fink titled  The Origin 
of Geometry , a historicity that coincides with the capability to leave traces, whereas 
the vitality of a tradition consists of the capability to institutionalize the way in 
which these traces are both reproduced and interpreted (Hua VI  1954 , 371). 
 The argumentative strategy Husserl adopts to describe the connection between 
the rootedness in a  Heimat and the historicity that marks the essence of mankind 
could recall the similar tones we fi nd in Heidegger’s commentaries of Hölderlin’s 
hymns “Germanien” and “Der Rhein.” 21 But it would be misleading to follow the 
superfi cial resemblance of tones, even if the temptation to do so could seem 
 appealing (especially if we consider that the text where Husserl speaks of human 
historicity is more or less coeval with Heidegger’s lecture courses). Notwithstanding 
his insisting on the  völkisch dimension that is taken for characteristic of any human 
rootedness in a country, Husserl is able to draw a connection between the feeling of 
belonging to one country and the human capability to cross boundaries and to per-
ceive the whole of humanity as an extension of our homeland: even if the way I 
perceive the world is biased by the manner in which the human group I belong to 
has always perceived it, nevertheless what I perceive is the same world I share with 
the rest of humanity. Precisely the possibility to turn back to the unique world, 
meant as the source of all objectivity, allows me also to perceive the unity encom-
passing all different cultural traditions (Hua XXXIX  2008 , 340). In this sense, we 
must recognize how deep Husserl’s commitment to the tradition of the Enlightenment 
was, a statement that does not apply to Heidegger’s philosophical position. At the 
same time, we must recognize how strong, even in Husserl’s case, has been the 
temptation, which never ceased to haunt the European tradition of the Enlightenment, 
to identify the history of Europe with the most successful example of a unitary 
 cultural tradition, which would have revealed itself capable of overwhelming its 
own internal differences (Hua XXXIX  2008 , 349). 22 
 Now, regardless the rhetoric of ‘belonging’ that affects Husserl’s description of 
human historicity, what must be underlined here is the fact that Husserl’s late 
 refl ections are able to provide a convincing account of the reason why historicity is 
to be considered as the ultimate horizon of human experience. 23 Above all, it must 
21
  Heidegger ( 1999 ). 
22
  Derrida ( 1991 ). 
23
  It is worth taking notice that historicity, according to Husserl, constitutes even the ultimate hori-
zon of animal life in general. If the way a subject can experience historicity depends on its rooted-
ness in a territory, then an experience of the world that can be defi ned as historical cannot be denied 
with respect to animals. However, animals are not able to generate a tradition, which remains a 
peculiarity of human beings. On the other hand, the source of the human capability to generate a 
tradition, that is, to make sense of the experience of the world we all share as human beings, is 
deeply rooted in a biologically based characteristic, namely in the fact that we can produce signs 
by using the expressive potential of our corporeality (Hua XXXIX  2008 , 344–346). Even if con-
fi ned to a footnote, this clue of how complex Husserl’s analysis of historicity is seems to me no less 
important than the main objective I want to pursue within the present essay. 
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be stressed that the horizon that is at stake here is to be referred not only to the 
human  Umwelt , namely to all that surrounds human experience in both  geographical 
and cultural terms (belonging to a territory, speaking a language, sharing a given set 
of historically determined values, and so on). If it were so, nothing but the empirical 
dimension of our being rooted in the world would be affected by historicity. Husserl 
seems also to be tempted to confer a historical character even to the transcendental 
dimension that makes possible both the emergence and the formation of objectivity. 
Indeed, he claims that every act of knowledge, every form of knowledge, every 
formation bearing in itself the result of an act of knowledge ( Gebilde is the expres-
sion used by Husserl) is motivated. This means that knowledge, not differently from 
any other human activity, is part of a tradition, or, which is the same, is rooted in the 
unity of human history. Husserl makes this statement in a context introduced by a 
question concerning the absence of presuppositions that is supposed to characterise 
knowledge (Hua XXIX  1993 , 343). It is a common-sense statement that the absence 
of presuppositions is precisely the main characteristic of any scientifi c undertaking. 
But here we are taught not only that knowledge does not occur in absence of presup-
positions, but also that its own historicity is precisely that which knowledge presup-
poses at a deepest level. Husserl goes on with his argument as follows. Acts that 
confer a meaning on an object, and do so in a way that raises this meaning to the 
level of universal validity, cannot be detached from the historical horizon to which 
they belong, nor from the objects the validity of which they attempt to establish. 
Notwithstanding its being generated within the horizon of  history, this established 
validity of objects does not cease to inform the complex of scientifi c knowledge. If 
we operate at the level of the latter, as scientists or so, we can be forgetful of the 
historical process that generated it. But if we continue to adhere to the phenomeno-
logical way of looking at scientifi c knowledge, we cannot  overlook the dependence 
of acts conferring objectivity upon the broader context of intersubjectivity. Thus, the 
objectivity possessed by the objects of the lifeworld is thoroughly historical 
(Hua XXIX  1993 , 347f). 
 Some important consequences can be drawn from the relationship between 
historicity and the self-positioning of phenomenology as a science of the life-
world. On the one hand, phenomenology can turn itself into an ontology of the 
lifeworld—or, an a priori anthropology—without losing its transcendental charac-
ter only if the task of this ontology consists of an investigation of the invariants 
that mark the human being in the world. Yet, if the main invariant, to which all 
other invariants are to be traced back, is historicity, then there is no place at all for 
an investigation that is supposed to differ essentially from the one carried out by 
Humanities. If we  consider the research project that informs the humanities in 
general, we potentially gain a complete description of the different ways of inhab-
iting the world, a description that includes even those invariants that are to be 
found within every cultural tradition. This description may be a fi nite one at a 
given moment of its own internal development, but it is virtually infi nite in the 
sense that the horizon within which it takes place is precisely the infi nite horizon 
of human history. On the other hand, in the present context an important role is 
played by the relationship  investigated by phenomenology between the realm of 
logical forms and the extent to which they suspend their peculiar onmitemporality 
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to become part of the structure of meaning the subject needs in order to build up 
a coherent and consistent account of the world. If this relationship forms one of 
the most important issues of phenomenological investigation (if not the most 
important one), and if the result of this investigation, as we have seen above, 
brings us to acknowledge the insurmountable historicity of those processes that 
lead to the formation and establishment of  objectivity, then it turns out to be 
inevitable to suppress any difference between phenomenology and a critical 
epistemology. The aim of the latter is precisely to make evident which historical, 
cultural, and political biases must be taken into consideration to explain the 
emergence and the sedimentation of any form of knowledge. 24 
 Are the consequences just drawn above a strained interpretation of some isolated 
passages of Husserl’s late refl ection? Probably not, however, if we want to be 
consistent with respect to the main goal we are pursuing here, namely to explore the 
possibility of a postfoundational phenomenology, what we are concerned with 
should not be biased by this question. The interconnection between the empirical 
and the transcendental subject, which goes through Husserl’s refl ection on the 
 lifeworld (Hua VI  1954 , 190, 214, 268), is the point of departure we need to justify 
our attempt at moving from a ‘pure’ phenomenology to a phenomenologically- 
oriented stance that understands itself as a discourse that cannot be detached from 
the fi eld occupied by the Humanities. The transcendental subject is the last instance 
to which the process of foundation must terminate; the fi nal result of the latter is the 
discovery that every sense-formation [ Sinnbildung ] depends on intersubjectivity, 
and this is the reason why Husserl insists on emphasizing the fact that even the 
objectivity that characterizes scientifi c knowledge is subject-relative. A part of this 
discovery is the historical nature of the problems discussed by phenomenology as a 
science of the lifeworld (Hua VI  1954 , 378). Husserl was surely close to claiming 
that only by taking seriously the historicity of the lifeworld itself would it have been 
possible to achieve the fi nal scope promised by a radical phenomenological founda-
tion. What he was not ready to recognize, however, was that this radical foundation 
should have been understood in terms of a thorough historicisation of subjectivity 
as well. 25 As a clue of the resistance offered by Husserl against this historicisation, 
we should look at the way in which he speaks, in some passages, of the invariants 
that are also constitutive of human experience of the world. Differently from the 
above quoted passages where the anthropological nature of these invariants has 
been stated very clearly, Husserl tries sometimes to defi ne these invariants in 
opposition to what could be the result of the efforts made by a historian in order to 
24
 A good example of what could be understood as a sound and convincing accomplishment of a 
critical epistemology can be found in Foucault’s work (especially in Foucault  1972 , where the 
interweaving of empirical and transcendental within the production of scientifi c discursivity has 
been made explicit as an object of investigation). It is also worth mentioning the relationship 
between Foucault’s philosophy and the way in which Cavaillès took up and modifi ed Husserlian 
phenomenology: in doing so, Cavaillès prepared the ground necessary to every further develop-
ment along the path we are suggesting here (see Cavaillès  1947 ). 
25
  Ströker ( 1993 ), 165–205. 
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describe the process of sense-sedimentation [ Sinnsedimentierung ]. Husserl gives 
indeed the impression that it is always possible to distinguish the empirical work 
of the historian from a transcendental analysis of the invariant structures of the 
historical world. The meaning of these structures could be caught and perceived 
with evidence thanks to a refl ection on the historical material the aim of which is to 
purify it from its empirical character (Hua XXIX  1993 , 241). Once again, the 
obsession with ‘purity’ seems to be Husserl’s main concern. 
 However, for the argument we are putting forth here it is above all worth drawing 
our attention to how Husserl understands the method we need to attain the knowledge 
of the invariants that underlie any form of given experience of the world. Husserl 
simply refers to the already well-functioning method of free variation. The method 
has been available within phenomenology for a long time and has been applied 
whenever the old question of the universal needed to undergo a phenomenological 
investigation. As in the previous cases, Husserl attempts to preserve the purity of the 
essence attained thanks to the free variation; further, he does not seem to deviate from 
the conviction that the pure essence of the singular object starting from which the 
variation begins is nothing but what the object has always included as a constitutive 
part of its own object-like character. On one hand, we could reproach Husserl for 
having not discussed the difference (if any) between the free variation and the classical 
method of induction. On the other hand, we could observe that the method is caught 
in a vicious circle, in the sense that certain knowledge of the universal is already 
presupposed whenever we choose a given singular object and decide to ‘extract’ the 
essence it contains by applying the method of free variation. At any rate, we cannot 
really address here the objections the method of free variation could easily undergo. 
In order to do this, we should engage in a deeper discussion of the whole issue. 
In the present context, the only thing we should not overlook is the coincidence 
between the phenomenological method of free variation and the comparison 
between similar states of affairs that can be found within the praxis of the Humanities. 
The world that surrounds me refers to an infi nite horizon that includes both events 
and processes that occurred in the past, and events and processes that are taking 
place now elsewhere. At the same time, I also know that it is always possible to refer 
to the general structure of the lifeworld (Hua VI  1954 , 142). The latter, as we have 
seen above, makes both the cultural and the historical crossing possible. What I 
perceive along with those crossings can be recorded, measured, tested, analysed, 
accounted for: in other words, scientifi c knowledge of both historical and cultural 
differences is possible. The epistemic basis for any scientifi c recording of and 
accounting for cultural and historical data is given by my capability to put forth a 
continuum that begins with the already-known and moves to the unknown all the 
possible forms of historical existence. Husserl claims that this modalisation of 
my own horizon is not completely free, in the sense that it is still subdued to the 
spatial and temporal biases that make up every human experience of the world 
(Hua XXIX  1993 , 63–65). We can easily agree with this claim without evoking 
once again the aforementioned diffi culties related to the method of free variation. 
But there is a further step to be taken, namely to notice that a  methodology based 
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on the progressive extension of horizons has been constituting the core of any 
form of scientifi c knowledge since the humanities began to refl ect on their own 
epistemic status. 
 A clear awareness of this issue can be found in the discussion about the 
 reliability of our historical sources concerning ancient Rome. This discussion, 
which took place during the fi rst part of the eighteenth century, came before the 
establishment of a self-confi dent historical discipline, but it is worth mentioning 
because it clearly shows that the historical consciousness, once raised, bears with 
itself the necessity to cope with questions of methodological nature. Some 
decades later, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, on German soil, which 
has been understood as the cradle of a rigorous philology since that moment, we 
encounter a Friedrich August Wolf, who was able to state very clearly the hypo-
thetical nature of all assertions made within the historical reconstruction of the 
past—a hypothetical nature that does not imply a diminished rigour. But it is due 
to August Boeckh if we can better grasp the fact that any historical knowledge 
rests on the possibility to modify our own horizon until we reach a sound under-
standing of what makes up the peculiarity of other cultures and other historical 
ages. “ Erkenntnis des Erkannten ” (“knowing of the known”) was the formula 
uttered by Boeckh in order to make clear the  necessary relationship between the 
point of departure of scientifi c knowledge, that is, the living horizon within 
which I act as a subject, and the alien world that must be submitted to investiga-
tion. Not different from the modalisation of the horizon within which the subject 
of knowledge operates is the procedure adopted by the anthropologist. The 
anthropological discipline, born offi cially in the second part of the nineteenth 
century, is in fact based on a method that can be seen as an application of the 
philologist’s method in a fi eld where we cannot rely on written sources as far as 
the access to otherness is concerned. 
 The examples that could be mentioned here are innumerable—and if I do not go 
into details, it is not because the length of the present contribution would not allow 
it: more simply, it is the whole history of the Humanities during the modern age that 
should be taken into consideration here. 26 But the point that deserves our attention 
remains the aforementioned similarity between the methodology suggested by 
Husserl in order to capture the invariants of the lifeworld and the method effectively 
applied within the Humanities in order to achieve the necessary acquaintance with 
alien forms of life. 
 The last—and conclusive—point of our investigation concerns the question 
whether an autonomous place for a philosophical questioning can be maintained. 
The proposed postfoundational phenomenology could be read as a suggestion 
to merge any philosophical inquiry with the encyclopaedia of the Humanities. 
But there is a specific function that is still to be accomplished by philosophy. 
26
  In Leghissa ( 2007 ), there is a more detailed account of the epistemic structure of the Humanities 
with special reference to classical philology, which has been the fi rst discipline among the 
Humanities to develop the methodological awareness we are dealing with here. 
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As Husserl knew very well, scientifi c disciplines do not always bind together the 
theory they attempt to shape of a specifi c fi eld with the epistemology the same 
theory rests on (Hua XVII  1974 , 8, 32). To elucidate the various forms taken by 
the relation between the two would be precisely the task of a phenomenologi-
cally-oriented philosophy. Such a task would not coincide with a ‘transcendental 
foundation’ of the sciences of the lifeworld, as the phenomenologist’s glance is 
entirely internal to the level where the description of the lifeworld takes place. It 
would rather mean to turn the phenomenological attitude from a ‘refl ection 
above’ the validity of the world into a ‘refl ection within’ the historical processes 
that inform the intesubjective constitution of the world. Put in this way, we can 
bestow a new meaning on Husserl’s seemingly obscure remarks on the  einströ-
men . Under this notion, which is present both in the  Krisis (Hua VI  1954 , 115, 
213) and in the related texts (Hua XXIX  1993 , 77–83), Husserl referred to the 
fact that phenomenology, as well as any other form of theory that brings in itself 
the awareness of the subjective-relative character of knowledge, ‘fl ows into’ the 
lifeworld it refl ects on. Such a ‘fl owing into,’ or  einströmen , can be well under-
stood as the form phenomenology assumes in the moment in which it decides to 
accompany the efforts made by human beings when they keep the world at a 
distance in order to gain a critical attitude towards it. Not different from other 
forms of critical theory, but perhaps better equipped than they are as far the exer-
cise of distantiation is concerned, phenomenology can then present itself as a 
praxis, more precisely as that specifi c form of exercise that is required whenever 
we have to deal with the paradox generated by the  intersubjective  constitution of 
the world. 
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